Category Archives: LGBT

The Only Protected Class — White Evangelicals

For the past several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been on a crusade to end the “special status” of minority groups.  While it is abundantly clear that the purpose of the Civil War Amendments and the various Civil Rights Acts were to help, first African-Americans, and then women, achieve equality, the current majority of the U.S. Supreme Court want to act as if the law requires a “color-blind” (and implicitly a “gender-blind”) approach in which any effort by the government (or private institutions) in taking steps to assure that minority and women have a chance at success will be struck down.   Simply put, African-Americans, Hispanics, and women are no longer going to benefit from a “most-favored nation” status in civil rights laws.  On the other hand, the favored group of the Republican Party (White evangelicals) are entitled to such status.

This week saw the new legal order exemplified in three opinions.

First, and most obvious, was the decision in Students” for “Fair” Admissions, Inc, vs. President and Fellows of Harvard College.  While the outcome of the case is not surprising as an exercise in raw power by the six Republicans on the Supreme Court, the bottom line is the equal protection clause and Title VI ban any attempt to help African-Americans overcome centruries of discrimination by giving them a “plus” in consideration for spots at “selective” universities and professional schools.  The opinion does leave a limited exception in recognizing that these universities use essays as part of the admissions process and, of course, free speech would bar the government from implementing a ban on references to the racial background of the applicant in these essays.  The Supreme Court directs, however, that in considering these essays, admissions offices should solely consider how these essays reflect barriers that the applicant has overcome or other aspects of the applicant’s character.  Of course, nothing in the majority opinion bans giving a plus to “legacy” candidates even if legacy candidates will be primarily composed of wealthy whites.  The one positive aspect of these opinions is that, like with last year’s abortion decision, this decision costs Republicans their wedge issue.  For the past fifty years, affirmative action has placed minorities against those with lower levels of white privilege for the last spots in government program and kept both groups from focusing on the slots that were reserved for those with Privilege.  Whether, with affirmative action no longer around, the powers that be in the Republican Party can keep folks from taking a look at the preferences given to the children of alumni and wealth donors that take aways spots from both middle class whites and minorities who actually earned a slot at the top colleges will be a big question going forward. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court — Two Weeks to Go

We are now down to two weeks left before the effective end of this year’s Supreme Court term.  (Officially, the term ends at the start of October when the next term begins.  But the Supreme Court usually issues all of its opinions before the Fourth of July and only handles emergency matters in July, August, and September.)  As was noted in the post two weeks ago, there are some unwritten rules regarding how the workload is distributed among the justices which makes it possible (not easy but possible) to speculate about who might have which cases.

One complicating factor in this year’s term (as discussed two weeks ago and last week) is that we do not know how many written opinions we are getting this term.  There are three ways that we could end up with fewer opinions:  1) in related cases, the Supreme Court could “consolidate” the cases and issue one opinion covering both cases (this normally happens before argument, but can happen when opinions are assigned); 2) in related cases, the Supreme Court could decide to issue a signed opinion in one case and an unsigned opinion in the other case; and 3) the Supreme Court can dismiss a case after argument.  We have already seen all three possibilities occur this term.  We could have up to eighteen opinions still to come this term.  At the present time, we know that we will have two opinion days this upcoming week.  In last week’s two opinion days, we only get five opinions, but we got six opinions on one day back in May.  My hunch says that we are likely looking at two or three opinion days the week of June 26, but the Supreme Court tends to keep that information closely held and it tends to not announce the last opinion day until the next-to-last opinion day.

How many opinions we have left matters because the Supreme Court tends to try to keep the workload balanced.  If we have eighteen opinions left, there will be fifty-six total opinions for the term which would mean that every justice would have six opinions with two justices getting seven opinions.  But it is possible that some of the remaining cases could have no opinion.  While, due to Justice Jackson recusing in the Harvard case, it is unlikely that the two Affirmative Action cases will be consolidated, it is easy to see a signed opinion in the North Carolina case and an unsigned opinion in the Harvard case.  We could see a consolidated opinion in the student loan forgiveness cases.  And everyone is expecting a dismissal in the North Carolina redistricting case. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court — Thursday Blockbusters

Normally, at this time of the year, I am posting a look at the big cases to be decided in the last two to three weeks.  I got a little delayed this year by the redistricting posts, and  The Supreme Court beat me to the punch by releasing two of the biggest opinions of the term  — Texas vs. California and Fulton vs. Philadelphia.  

Texas is the latest, and hopefully last, round of the Republicans attempts to use the courts to accomplish what they can’t do in Congress — repeal the Affordable Care Act.  The latest theory was that, by repealing the tax penalty that is part of the individual mandate, Congress effectively repealed the entire Affordable Care Act.

Understanding the issues in the case requires a brief detour into the back history of the case and some basic things that most lawyers learn in law school (but which the dissent kindly forgets).  Before the New Deal, there were a lot of doctrines that a conservative Supreme Court used to block progressive legislation.  And, as will be discussed in the post on the remaining cases, it is important to understand that many in the Federalist Society think that the “Old Court” got it right and oppose the changes that the Supreme Court made in the 1940s to those doctrines.  One of those changes was a much broader definition of the power of the federal government to regulate economic matters under the Commerce Clause.  And when the Affordable Care Act was enacted, most thought that the individual mandate was authorized by the Commerce Clause.  And when the Republicans first challenged the individual mandate, the defense of the mandate relied, in part, on its significance in the overall scheme.  Unfortunately for the future of the Affordable Care Act, when the Supreme Court first analyzed the Affordable Care Act, the Chief Justice sided with the conservatives on the Commerce Clause issue but was willing to find that it was authorized as a tax.  When Republicans managed to repeal the tax in 2017, conservatives saw an opportunity to use that repeal to take a second run at the individual mandate and the Affordable Care Act. Continue Reading...

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Pardon this Interruption

Pardon this interruption to the viewing of tonight’s speeches from President Obama and Senator Harris, but the United States Supreme Court has, in its unintentional way, given us a reminder about what this election is about.

Today, the United States Supreme Court announced its November argument session.  That session begins on November 2, the day before the election, and continues until November 10.   (While the argument session usually has six argument days, the last day would fall on Veteran’s Day; so there will only be five argument days.)

While the United States Supreme Court normally tries to avoid doing anything overtly political on election day, this year’s docket brings political issues to the center more than some on the Court would probably like.  While one of the two cases being heard on election day is a typical federal criminal law statutory dispute of the type that puts non-lawyers to sleep, the other case (Jones vs. Mississippi) is a continuation of the Supreme Court’s examination of what sentences are appropriate for juveniles tried as an adult. Continue Reading...

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Equality Maybe?

In a somewhat surprising decision, the United States Supreme Court issued its long awaited decision on Title VII and the LGBTQ community.  There were several unexpected things in the opinion.  Going in the best bet was that the Supreme Court would find that discrimination against transgender individuals fit the requirement that the discrimination was “on the basis of sex,” but that the Supreme Court would find that “on the basis of sex” did not cover sexual orientation.  Second, because of this potential split in the reasoning, there was a good reason to expect two separate opinions, one dealing with the two homosexual employees and one dealing with the transgender employees.  Third, as I noted on Saturday, it looked like Chief Justice Roberts would be writing at least one of the opinions.

Instead, what we got was one opinion covering all three cases that sided with the employees.  Even more unexpected was that the justice holding the stolen Supreme Court seat — Justice Neal Gorsuch — was the author of the opinion.  (Yes, part of me is having thrills of joys at how Trump is going to be able to explain this one to the folks who just voted out a conservative Republican congressman for officiating at a same-sex marriage.)  Of course, the opinion was not unanimous, (6-3 with Chief Justice Roberts joining the majority) and two justices (Justice Alito and Justice Kavanaugh) wrote dissents driving the total length  of the opinions in this case to 172 pdf pages.

Now for the bad news.  First, the dissenters tried to hide their true colors on the issue of equality by painting this case (like the previous decisions in the gay marriage cases) as being about what the law is, not what the law should be.  They even went so far as to express the incredible belief that, but for this decision, we are within years of Congress acting to expand anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation, claiming that the Supreme Court was overstepping its bounds by acting.  (Of course, they failed to identify the reason why the proposed fix has never managed to get past both houses in the same session — Republican Party control of the other house.  See the above-mentioned result this weekend in the nominating convention for Virginia’s Fifth District.) Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court October 2019 Term — COVID 19 Reset

As with other institutions of government, COVID 19 has caused a degree of chaos in the court system.  The judicial system requires a degree of interaction between parties and judges, and social distancing requires finding new ways to handle these interactions.

The Supreme Court, like every other judicial institution, has had to find ways to cope.  Of course, the Supreme Court has been a notoriously slow institution to adapt to modern technology.  It was the last federal court to accept electronic filing.  As recently as a few years ago, everything but emergency petitions were filed by mailing (or having somebody personally deliver them) to the Supreme Court.

As this site has discussed over the years, the Supreme Court is what lawyers call a discretionary court.  That means that, with a limited number of exceptions, a party has to request that the Supreme Court take a case (the formal name for the request is a petition for writ of certiorari).  The Supreme Court then decides if it wants to hear the case.  So most of the decisions of the Supreme Court are decisions to not take a case.  There are also two small categories of cases in which the Supreme Court takes and immediately decides the case — both involving a reversal of the lower court.  One category is frequently referred to as “grant, vacate, and remand.”  Those cases typically involve an issue that the Supreme Court decided while the application for review is pending.  In these cases, the Supreme Court grants review, vacates the decision on that issue by the lower court, and remands (sends the case back) for the lower court to reconsider in light of the recently decided Supreme Court case on the issue.  The other is summary reversal.  These cases typically involve the unanimous conclusion that the lower court simply ignored the prior decisions of the Supreme Court.    But every year, the Supreme Court decides that it wants to fully hear approximately 70 cases per year (representing about 1% of the applications that the Supreme Court receives). Continue Reading...

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Title VII and Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity — Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court Argument

Most summaries of the Supreme Court arguments on the three Title VII cases on sexual orientation/gender identity reflect that the arguments were a rather convoluted mess.  While I have a hunch that we are heading toward a 5-4 decision with the judges splitting on partisan lines, there was enough in the argument to blur the lines as justices seemed to depart from their traditional stances.

One of the big debate in legal fields over the past 100 years is about the theory of “legal realism.”  In oversimplified terms, legal realism contends that judges are just politicians wearing robes and that they decide cases based solely on their policy preferences.  The alternative theory, as expounded by Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearing, is that judges are just umpires calling the balls and strikes based on rules drawn up by others.  In this latter school of thought, judges are trying to interpret the meaning of texts and should not be concerned about the real world consequences of their decisions.

Much of the debate in the ball and strikes theory is about the proper method of interpreting legal texts.  In recent years, conservatives have been big on textualism.  Textualism posits that words in a text have meaning.  If some of the terms are ambiguous, there are rules that can be applied to clarify the text (e.g., by looking at the term in the context of that statute and how that term is used in other similar statutes).  The alternative to textualism is often a reference to legislative history, but — as many statutes were written during a time when liberals had the upper hand in Congress — legislative history (primarily the reports summarizing what a bill was intended to achieve) often supported a more liberal result.  So conservative judges argued that those reports were never actually approved by Congress and that judges should only look at what Congress actually passed — the statutory language itself. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court Term Preview — October 2019 Term (Part I)

It’s that time of year again.  October 7 is the First Monday in October meaning that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court will be back in D.C. for another term of arguments.  This term is a little bit unusual for recent terms in that — when the Supreme Court had left for the summer — they had already granted review in enough cases to fill the first four (October, November, December, and January) argument sessions.  Recently, the Supreme Court has had trouble granting enough cases to fill the first three argument sessions and have had (at most) one or two cases left over for January when they meet at the end of September to begin adding cases.

(For a little explanation of what I mean about argument sessions and filling them.   From October through April, the Supreme Court has seven argument sessions.  Each session consists of arguments on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday — excluding any federal or religious holidays.  A “normal” argument day consists of two arguments on two cases.  Ech argument is one hour split evenly between the two-sides although time is often allocated to the Solicitor General to express the government’s position.  Typically, there is a two-week gap between each argument session except for longer breaks after the December and maybe January session.  A Supreme Court case has two rounds of written arguments.  The first round is an application to the Supreme Court to take a case — officially called a petition for writ of certiorari.  These pleadings have relatively short page limits and are designed mostly to explain why the case is important enough for the court to take.  While there are time limits on these pleadings, the Supreme Court is relatively liberal about granting extensions.  If the Supreme Court decides to grant review, there is a second round of written arguments on the merits of the case followed by the oral argument.    The time limits to complete the second round of written arguments is approximately 105 days or 10 days before oral argument whichever is earliest — and extensions are almost unheard of.  Thus, oral argument has to be at least three months after the case is accepted for full briefing and argument — and four is better.  So, any case heard in the first three months has to be accepted before the Supreme Court recesses at the end of June,  And once the Supreme Court returns, any January cases have to be accepted by the end of the October session, etc. until all of the cases for this year’s term have to be accepted by the end of the January session.  Any case accepted after January is for the next year’s term barring an unusual case in which the Supreme Court orders accelerated briefing like what happened last term on the Census case.)

At this point in time, the Supreme Court has issued its argument calendars for the October, November, and December argument sessions.  While it has not yet released the calendar for the January session, it is likely that most of the remaining accepted cases will be heard in January (although some add-ons from cases accepted in October is possible).  Each of the first three parts of this series will focus on one argument session with the fourth part focusing on the cases left over for likely January argument and possible cases that might be granted for the rest of the term.  Any attempt to guess what is likely to be granted is highly speculative.  The Supreme Court accepts about 1% of the cases for actual full review.  Even weeding out the significant amount of long shot petitions, the strongest cases have — at most — a 1 in 10 shot at being granted review. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court and Sexual Orientation

While we wait for the major decisions from this term over the next seven weeks, the Supreme Court has added three cases for next term (likely to be argued in the Fall and decided next Spring) involving sexual orientation and employment.  Two cases involve gay men who allege that they were terminated for being homosexual and one involves a transgender individual who alleges discrimination based on that status.  While at the lower court level, all three claimed, in part, that one of the factors in the employment decision was their failure to comply with gender stereotypes (i.e. they did not conform to the employer’s expectations for male behavior), that claim is only part of the Supreme Court case for the transgender individual.

These cases are going to be difficult for the employees to win, especially the two gay men.  Their claim is statutory, based on Title VII (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended) which bars discrimination in employment “because of sex.”  And the natural reading of “because of sex” is “because of gender.”  That is the way that the Supreme Court has always read the provision.  And, even today, many states and government agencies use “sex” when they mean gender (e.g., on driver’s licenses and application forms).  The arguments of the employees is hindered by the fact that their claim is statutory rather than constitutional.  Other than the most conservative justices, the justices are somewhat willing to apply constitutional texts and principles to new issues.  Put simply, a constitutional amendment is viewed as an extraordinary thing.  Thus, if a claim is similar enough to existing constitutional protections, courts will sometimes find that it fits under those protections. 

On the other hand, notwithstanding the current problems in Congress, courts tend to see statutory problems as something that the legislature could fix if the legislature wanted to fix the problems.  And Congress has failed to pass proposed legislation that would amend Title VII to include sexual orientation (or create Title VII-type protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation).  Continue Reading...

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Sound and Fury Signifying (Almost) Nothing — Masterpiece Cakeshop

I knew when I posted a summary of what cases were left for the term, that there were good chances that the Supreme Court would issue a “stop the presses” opinion today that would be difficult to explain, given how many major cases were left and that several of them had some weird procedural issues.  Well today, we got one of those opinions that everybody was waiting for, and it turned out to be a big dud that ultimately decided nothing other than the individual case.

Masterpiece Cake was one of those cases that seemed to be major.  Earlier this decade, as states began to recognize the right to same-sex marriage and to expand civil rights laws to cover sexual orientation, fundamentalist public interest groups have been seeking to push cases to allow true believers to exempt themselves from generally applicable laws, primarily related to same sex marriage but also to contraception and “morning after” pills.  And eventually, they managed to get the United Supreme Court to accept Masterpiece Cake as the test case for this issue.   The basic issue as presented by the parties was whether the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment allows a seller of expressive products to refuse — based on their religious or political beliefs that homosexuality is morally wrong — to provide a product to a same sex couple.  In this case, the product was a cake for a reception celebrating a same sex marriage.  While there was nothing on the cake that expressly endorsed same-sex marriage, the claim was that merely providing the product effectively signaled an endorsement of the marriage.

A problem, however, developed during oral argument.  In Colorado, the initial stage of a civil rights case is a hearing before an administrative body — the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  During that hearing, one of the members of the Commission committed a gaffe.  In addressing the assertion that the baker should be allowed to discriminate based on a sincere religious belief, one of the commissioners noted that religion had been used to support slavery and the Holocaust.  This statement met all of the classical definitions of a gaffe:  it revealed what the speaker truly thought; as a factual assertion, it was technically defensible (as religion has  been used, and conservative are willing to admit is still true in the case of some Muslims, to support horrendously evil acts); and it is not something that is acceptable to say.    In terms of this case, however, it supported the proposition that the baker did not receive a fair hearing on the issue of whether he should receive some type of exemption from civil rights law based on his religious belief because, at least one member of the Commission, believed that religious beliefs are entitled to no wait whatsoever.

At the end of oral argument, two things were clear.  First, Justice Kennedy — ever the swing vote — wanted a solution that both respected the rights of the same sex couple while not denigrating religious beliefs.  Second, Justice Kennedy had major problems with what the commissioner said during the hearing.   When the Supreme Court issued its opinion,  it was written by Justice Kennedy and, surprise surprise, he managed to focus on the “improper” comments of the commissioners while including face-saving language for both sides that gave only minimal guidance for what lower courts should do in similar cases that are currently pending.

While technically, the vote was 7-2 for the result and six of the seven justices in the majority joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, when you consider the other opinions, the vote was actually 2-2-3-2.  The core two was Justice Kennedy along with Chief Justice Roberts who did not join any other opinion.  The second two was a concurring opinion written by Justice Kagan for herself and Justice Breyer.  The three was Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Thomas (who did not join the opinion of the majority) with a concurring opinion written by Justice Gorsuch for himself and Justice Alito and an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment written by Justice Thomas for himself and Justice Gorsuch.  Finally, there was a dissent written by Justice Ginsburg for herself and Justice Sotomayor.

The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy noted that generally applicable laws might defeat any Free Exercise claim but found that the expressed bias of the commissioners hearing the case violated the baker’s due process rights.  In particular, the opinion found that Colorado certainly has the authority to include sexual orientation within the civil rights laws and that, in the absence of a valid claim for exemption, to require individuals to provide goods and services to the LGBT community.  Justice Kennedy took care to emphasize that the comments in question were made by the agency functioning as the trial court on this case during the hearing process — a distinction that may become important in the travel ban case.  In theory, this case will now go back to Colorado for a new hearing in front of the Commission (presumably with different membership given the passage of time since the initial hearing) at which it could reach the same or a different result.

Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion attempts to minimize one fact that played a role in the majority opinion — the different treatment of other bakers who declined to decorate a cake with anti-LGBT messages.  While the majority saw this as evidence of disparate treatment, Justice Kagan saw this distinction as compelled by the civil rights law in issue which banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.  As refusing to engage in discrimination does not violate a law banning discrimination, Justice Kagan found nothing noteworthy in the Commission’s rejection of the frivolous complaints against these other bakers.

Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, while noting the rule that states do not have to create exemptions from generally applicable laws for sincere religious beliefs finds that the disparate treatment of people who support and oppose discrimination means that the law is not generally applicable.  Of course, this claim is logically weak.  All laws reflect some viewpoint of right and wrong.   A law against animal sacrifice is generally applicable despite the fact that it only punishes those who want to engage in animal sacrifice.  Alternatively, Justice Gorsuch suggests that none of the bakers were discriminating based on status but only based on the content of the message put forth by the cake.  Again, this argument ignores that the message that some bakers refused to provide was an express message of bigotry while the message that the baker in this case refused to provide was only his own internal interpretation of an implicit message arising out of the use to which his customer would put his product.

Justice Thomas finds that there is a free speech exception to civil rights laws when the discriminatory conduct is expressive and would find that custom cakes are expressive.

Finally, Justice Ginsburg finds that, regardless of the comments by one commissioner, the full review process removes any taint from the ultimate result.

Because the majority opinion does not reach the ultimate result in this case, it is tough to read the tea leaves for future cases.  There are clearly four votes for the proposition that civil rights laws can ban discrimination even if the would-be discriminators assert that they are acting based on their faith rather than bigotry.  The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy appear to generally support this proposition while recognizing that there is some exception — at least for ministers being asked to perform a religious service — where the act can only be seen as a religious exercise.  Where exactly the line between these two should be drawn is left for another day.

Three other cases were decided today, leaving twenty-five cases for the last three weeks of the term.

 

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